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TWO UNDERSTANDINGS OF SUPREMACY:
AN ESSAY
Vincent J. Samar*
I. INTRODUCTION
Does the supremacy provision of Article VI of the U.S. Consti-
tution undermine the legal force of international law in the United
States?  Recently, there has been some debate on this issue arising out
of the claim that if the U.S. Constitution is “the supreme law of the
land,” and that only constitutional officers of the United States, in
keeping with their responsibilities to uphold the Constitution, can de-
cide what is international law for the U.S.1 Such debates are not new
to the history of the world.  For much of world history, national rulers
have claimed that their legal authority derives from some supreme
source, be it: God,2 tradition,3 or, in more recent democratic times of
* Vincent J. Samar is an Adjunct Professor of Law at the Illinois Institute of
Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law and also an Adjunct Professor of Philos-
ophy at both Loyola University Chicago and Oakton Community College.
The author wants to thank Professor Mark Strasser of Capital University
Law School for his close and searching review of the arguments and patience with
the author’s efforts to improve an earlier draft of this essay.  He also wants to
thank Professor Jona Goldschmidt of Loyola University Chicago, Department of
Criminal Justice, for his editorial suggestions and for providing an additional ref-
erence for the central issue of the essay.  This essay was inspired by a friend’s
challenge to say something new about the separation of church and state. I dedi-
cate this essay to Wes Huff and all those who believe this separation is essential to
guaranteeing human freedom.
1 Michael Paulsen has argued that “the Constitution is supreme over interna-
tional law.” For Paulsen, international legal standards in conflict with the Consti-
tution are unconstitutional.  Michael S. Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to
Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1765 (2009).  Paulsen is not
alone.  Ken Kersch has argued that use of foreign sources in constitutional inter-
pretation, the so-called “new transnationalism,” is driven by an elite, politically-
motivated worldwide trend toward judicial governance, which Kersch claims is an-
tithetical to both democratic self-rule and the rule of law. See Ken I. Kersch, The
New Legal Transnationalism, the Globalized Judiciary, and the Rule of Law, 4
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 345, 346, 348-49 (2005). See also Symposium,
Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 303 (2006).
2 John M. Kang, Appeal to Heaven: On Religious Origins of the Constitutional
Right of Revolution, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 281, 294 (2009).
3 See Victor E. Dike, Traditional Rulers and Democracy, NIGER DELTA CONGRESS,
http://www.nigerdeltacongress.com/tarticles/traditional_rulers_and_democracy.
htm; see also Timothy Case, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem Solv-
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which the Constitution is a part, the people.4  These claims of legal
authority are often set forth in sacred writings, historical records, or
constitutional documents, like Article VI of the U.S. Constitution.
However, once set down, these statements of supreme legal authority
may sometimes result in disenfranchising other important legal
sources outside the constitutionally authorized institutions.  This is es-
pecially evident in the United States where recent international laws
and decisions of international tribunals have come under attack be-
cause a treaty or customary international law was never formally
made part of the supreme law of the land.5
In this essay, I will examine how two different understandings
of the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution might impact the
United States becoming part of a world government.  My purpose in
focusing on the possibility of the U.S. becoming part of a world govern-
ment rather than whether specific international laws and decisions of
international tribunals are constitutional is to provide a gauge to con-
sider and evaluate these questions. If the United States is not constitu-
tionally barred from joining a world government, which would seem to
be the greatest deviation from constitutional supremacy, then certainly
matters of international law and the legal decisions of international
tribunals, because they deviate far less from such authority, ought not
to be trumped by constitutional supremacy provided they are otherwise
legitimate, even if they were created outside the three constitutionally
recognized branches of government.  A second purpose of this essay is
to show that if the federal supremacy clause is interpreted according to
my second thesis, the Constitution does not prevent the United States
from becoming part of a world government, even absent a formal
amendment permitting the affiliation.  This is not to say if the U.S.
were seriously to consider joining a world government, as it did join
the UN Charter under its treaty power, that various constitutional
provisions such as the treaty power might not prove useful in estab-
lishing the legitimacy of the affiliation, but that only a formal amend-
ing Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1490
(2004).
4 Walter F. Murphy, Designing a Constitution: Of Architects and Builders, 87 TEX.
L. REV. 1303, 1313 (2009).
5 This is to some extent illustrated by the disagreement among the justices over
the legitimacy of the recent Supreme Court decision in Medellin v. Texas, where
the Supreme Court ruled that Texas courts are not bound by a decision of the ICJ
because Congress did not intend that the treaty of compliance with ICJ judgments
would be self-executing.  552 U.S. 491 (2008).  The argument by Justice Breyer,
joined by two other dissenters, focused on the language of the relevant treaties,
including the Vienna Convention that should determine whether the ICJ’s deci-
sion would bind U.S. courts. Id. at 538-67.
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ment should not be necessary if the understanding afforded by Thesis
Two were to gain widespread acceptance in the legal community.
My further purpose in this essay is to show that the history of
the supremacy clause itself is more in line with the second proposed
thesis, as it better encompasses what the founders intended.  Section
II states what these two understandings of supremacy are and how
they might affect the United States in becoming part of a world gov-
ernment.  Section III asks what theoretical underpinnings lay behind
claims of legitimacy for any constitutional interpretation.  Section IV
looks at how the U.S. Constitution’s supremacy clause from its incep-
tion came to dominate state constitutional supremacy clauses while at
the same time being limited to respecting states’ rights and the rights
of persons.  Section V shows that only the second of my two under-
standings of federal supremacy is capable of accounting for this Ameri-
can foundational experience.  Section VI identifies background norms
that must coexist with any application of the second understanding
that might legitimize the United States becoming part of a world gov-
ernment.  Finally, section VII identifies types of governments that
would be unsuited to joining a world government either because their
supreme law prohibits such an affiliation or would likely impose ideo-
logical barriers to the kind of cooperation necessary to make such a
government effective.  I conclude with a comment about a challenge
likely to confront future generations of Americans, as use of interna-
tional law becomes the increasingly preferred means for establishing
world order.
II. TWO UNDERSTANDINGS OF SUPREMACY
Article VI; section two, of the U.S. Constitution states:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.6
The provision evokes a number of questions, including the one I want
to focus on: In what sense does the Constitution claim to be supreme?
It is my contention that the provision was not written to make
the federal government more efficient in a way the prior Congress
under the Articles of Confederation could not be.  Rather, the provision
is there because the founders believed, as will be seen in the next sec-
tion, that the source of the Constitution’s authority over the various
6 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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state governments was the people of the respective states acting collec-
tively to form “a more perfect union.”  Consequently, when the Consti-
tution speaks, it is in a sense the people speaking since there is no
other way for the population to speak as a whole short of a constitu-
tional amendment. Hence, what it says is what the people have de-
cided upon, whether right or wrong, in their collective wisdom.  I will
address the issue of how changing public opinion over time might af-
fect this understanding in a moment.
One view of this provision, which is strictly speaking not a nor-
mative view, but is perhaps the more common understanding of
supremacy I shall call Thesis One.  It states:
[The text declares] that the Constitution, all laws made in
furtherance of the Constitution, and all treaties made
under the authority of the United States are the “supreme
law of the land” and enjoy legal superiority over any con-
flicting provision of a state constitution or law.7
This particular thesis captures the usual meaning of
supremacy as “the quality or state of being supreme”8 and as “highest
in rank or authority.”9  It is a starburst thesis in the sense that it goes
out in all directions claiming authority unto itself.  It is also the sense
most often evoked in religious thought when statements of divine com-
mands are thought to have been put down for all eternity in some sa-
cred document(s).  It is also the sense adopted by those who believe
what the original founders thought ought to continue to endure as the
basis for establishing national authority over the states.10  However,
because the founders probably never envisioned world government, it
is difficult to imagine today what view they would have had concerning
the United States  becoming part of a world government.  Still, by a
careful look at what the founders did evoke by creating the supremacy
clause, it might be possible to glean an interpretation of their thinking
that would allow, without constitutional amendment, the United
States to join with other nations to form a world government.
Perhaps a better interpretation of Thesis One would be: “All
else being equal, it is only the federal relationship that the Constitu-
tion establishes between the branches of government and with the
states, that is supreme.”  Here, the Constitution’s authority in its
usual understanding remains, but only within a certain interpretative
7 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
8 Supremacy Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/supremacy.
9 Supreme Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/supreme.
10 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 44-47 (Princeton University Press 1997).
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context that includes preserving existing governmental structures and
subordinating the states to the authority the Constitution delegates to
the federal government.  The sense takes on a normative significance
if it also implies  what the Constitution says is right because it
emerged as the best alternative to establishing a government based
upon the thoughtful reflection and consent of the American people.
However, this also means that what the Constitution says is not un-
conditionally correct.  Even if one would not want to think the people
could be wrong, it was certainly the case that the founders were oper-
ating under conditions of limited information.  Consequently, if the
supremacy clause is understood in this way, it may limit the possibil-
ity of the United States ever joining a world government absent a con-
stitutional amendment, for surely such a joining would require a
change in at least some of the powers assigned to the various branches
of government or left open to the states.11
11 For example, the United Nations Charter (1945) provides: “All Members, shall
settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such manner that interna-
tional peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.” U.N. Charter art. 2,
para. 3.  Article 51 of the Charter states:
Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security.  Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way effect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
Clearly, these provisions, while not directly undermining the U.S. Constitution,
Article 1, Section 8.11’s grant of power to Congress “[t]o declare war;” surely these
provisions constrain that power.  They do so by way of treaty power granted to the
United States under Article II, Section 2 and Article VI of the Constitution to be-
come a signatory to the Charter.  U.S. Const. Art. II, sec. 2; U.S. Const. art. IV.
Contra Paulsen, supra note 1, at 1765, noting:
The constitutional supremacy thesis has an important corollary:
as a matter of U.S. constitutional law, the constitutional power
to interpret, apply, and enforce international law for the United
States is not possessed by, is not dependent upon, and can never
authoritatively be exercised by actors outside the constitution-
ally recognized Article I, Article II, and Article III branches of
the U.S. government.  The power to interpret and apply interna-
tional law for the United States is a power vested in officers of
the U.S. government, not in any foreign or international body.
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Put in that way, one immediately notes three areas of possible
concern on the Constitution’s so-called “supreme” authority.  First,
what is the extent or range of matters that can be judged as federal
matters?  Second, who makes that decision as to what constitutes a
federal matter: Is it the federal courts or can it be some outside author-
ity?  Must it always be the same?  Third, what is significance of the
phrase “all else being equal?”  Taken with this understanding, Thesis
One puts up too strong a barrier to the U.S. entering into a world gov-
ernment, at least not without major constitutional change.  That is be-
cause supremacy, as understood under Thesis One, sweeps away all
other values that not only might have encouraged this change, but
might also be part of how the Constitution came to be adopted.
Thesis One suggests amending the Constitution to make this
happen, if that is what the nation desires, but fails to appreciate that
such changes don’t always emerge in a finished form, and rather
evolve over time as the public becomes more sensitive to what they
are.  Thesis One affords too broad a range of unrestricted authority to
allow these conditions to manifest themselves in the law making pro-
cess, except by way of amendment.  At the point the country is ready to
amend the Constitution, three-quarters of the states—as Article VII
indicates—already agree with the change.  Additionally, Thesis One
fails to give due recognition to how the range of U.S. authority already
may be limited by existing international norms that define its contents
or determine the conditions under which it operates, and that these
norms more than the supremacy claim actually determine the author-
ity of the United States on international matters. Thesis One regard-
ing supremacy not only fails by affording too much clearance of its
path of operation, but also fails to afford adequate recognition to other
norms that might limit its operation.12
12 Problems relating important definitions to clearance are not new in science.
With the discovery during the latter half of the 20th century
of more objects within the Solar System and large objects around
other stars, disputes arose over what should constitute a planet.
There was particular disagreement over whether an object
should be considered a planet if it was part of a distinct popula-
tion such as a belt, or if it was large enough to generate energy
by the thermonuclear fusion of deuterium.
A growing number of astronomers argued for Pluto to be de-
classified as a planet, since many similar objects approaching its
size had been found in the same region of the Solar System (the
Kuiper belt) during the 1990s and early 2000s. Pluto was found
to be just one small body in a population of thousands.
Some of them including Quaoar, Sedna, and Eris were her-
alded in the popular press as the tenth planet, failing however to
receive widespread scientific recognition.  The discovery of Eris,
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Under the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court is
the final arbiter of what the Constitution means.13  This means that
the Court speaks as to the application and interpretation the Constitu-
an object 27 percent more massive than Pluto, brought things to
a head.
Acknowledging the problem, the [International Astronomi-
cal Union] set about creating the definition of planet, and [even-
tually] produced one in August 2006. . . .
. . . .
. . . After much debate and one failed proposal, the assembly
voted to pass a resolution that defined planets within the Solar
System as:
A celestial body that is (a) in orbit around the Sun, (b) has
sufficient mass for its self-gravity to overcome rigid body forces
so that it assumes a hydrostatic equilibrium (nearly round)
shape, and (c) has cleared the neighbourhood around its orbit.
Under this definition, the Solar System is considered to have
eight planets.  Bodies which fulfill the first two conditions but
not the third (such as Pluto, Makemake and Eris) are classified
as dwarf planets, provided they are not also natural satellites of
other planets.
Planet, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Planet (last visited  Sept. 27,
2010).  “Having cleared the neighbourhood of its orbit“ is a criterion for a celestial
body to be considered a planet in the Solar System.  This was one of the three
criteria adopted by the International Astronomical Union (IAU) in its 2006 defini-
tion of planet.” InternationalAstronomicalUnion.org, IAU 2006 General Assembly:
Result of the IAU Resolution Vote, http://www.iau.org/public_press/news/detail/
iau0603/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
13 In Marbury v. Madison, the Court states:
It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment [the judicial branch] to say what the law is.  Those who
apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and
interpret that rule.  If two laws conflict with each other, the
courts must decide on the operation of each.
So if a law [e.g., a statute or treaty] be in opposition to the
constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a par-
ticular case, so that the court must either decide that case con-
formably to the law, disregarding the constitution,; or
conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court
must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case.
This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
If then the courts are to regard the constitution; and the con-
stitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the
constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to
which they both apply.
Those then who controvert the principle that the constitu-
tion is to be considered, in court, as a paramount law, are re-
duced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their
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tion, not just about the Constitution.14  In this sense, the supremacy of
the Constitution and its limitations are carried over to the supremacy
of the Supreme Court.  If the Court finds itself limited by what it un-
derstands, for example, a federal question to be—in light of the chang-
ing relationship that has become recognized between the federal
government and the states—then the Court’s proclamations of what
the Constitution says are themselves further evidence that Thesis One
is too restrictive.  For by saying what the Constitution requires, the
Court is, in fact, saying what legally the Constitution means.15  The
fact that the Court will engage a variety of interpretative methods to
say what the Constitution means further suggests that claims of con-
stitutional supremacy, at least in democratic societies like the United
States, are not as totally encompassing as Thesis One would suggest.16
Perhaps a more circumscribed view for the sense of authority in Arti-
cle VI operates to account for what Thesis One exaggerated.  This new
view, which I call Thesis Two, states:
All else being equal, the text establishes that the Constitu-
tion and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and all
treaties made under the authority of the United States,
are the highest form of law in the American legal system,
mandating that state judges uphold them, when making
determinations of federal law even if state constitutions
or laws conflict.
In contrast with my earlier “starburst” thesis, the later thesis is more
directional, focusing the authority of the federal government over the
states.
eyes on the constitution, and see only the law [e.g., the statute or
treaty].
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all writ-
ten constitutions.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803).
14 Supreme Court opinions become constitutional law, not just a way to under-
stand the constitution.
15 Here I adopt a form of semantic interpretation that holds that the meaning of a
legal provision is given by what the words used would have been intended to con-
vey. See Ronald Dworkin, Comment in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETA-
TION 119-20 (Princeton University Press 1997).
16 See PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (Blackwell, 1991) in
which he identifies six modalities of constitutional interpretation that the Su-
preme Court has at various times and in particular decisions relied upon: histori-
cal (looking to what the framers intended), textual (the meaning of the words),
structural (inferences drawn from the structures of government set up), doctrinal
(past case precedents), and ethical (moral commitments reflected in the
Constitution).
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Regarding the range of the federal government’s authority
under Thesis Two, it is helpful to note that Article VI uses the phrase
“the supreme law of the land” suggesting that there may be a question
as to (1) what constitutes a “law of the land” and also (2) who decides
that question.  Article VI further states, “the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”17  This provision suggests
that federal court decisions concerning what constitutes a law of the
land trump contrary decisions by state court judges.  However, it does
not suggest that decisions by federal court judges should necessarily
trump decisions by judges of international courts, in particular, the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).  Perhaps, the views of ICJ
judges on international law (including international human rights)
should trump Supreme Court holdings.  No doubt this would be a mat-
ter of what substantive issue was involved, whether the international
aspect was deemed to be the determining factor, and who was making
the decision.  Still, when all else is not equal, when the focus is not
comparing other national legal systems but on creating a world order,
then the fact that the Constitution is the highest form of law in the
American legal system seems to leave open the possibility of a global/
international law trumping the Constitution.  Here too, the factors
aiding the determination may not be confined to national constitu-
tional mandates, but very well might include attendance to the princi-
ples and institutions (to the extent these are inscribed in treaties or
law) necessary to a smooth working system of global economics, protec-
tions for the environment, or human rights protections.
Under Thesis Two, federal law is supreme with the acknowl-
edgement that several issues remain undetermined: (a) what is the
law of the land and (b) who makes that determination when a question
of international or global law is involved?  Neither of these two ques-
tions can be answered by application of federal law alone without beg-
ging the question of how they might implicate international concerns.
Additionally, there is the problem of legitimacy.  What would the
American legal establishment count as an acceptable answer to these
questions?  While this essay will not attempt to answer all these ques-
tions, it will suggest a method for how we might begin to think about
them—a method that hopefully establishes legitimacy for decisions
that might fall under a Thesis Two view of supremacy.  Here, appeal to
“partial” normative political theory is essential.
III. LEGITIMACY
My thesis here is primarily centered on legitimacy, not justifi-
cation.  “By legitimacy” I shall mean: “the political standard that laws
17 U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2.
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and policies are required to pass in order to become formally recog-
nized.”18  This contrasts with justification as “the epistemic standard
on which a conclusion can be said to be adequately supported by a pro-
cess of reasoning.”19  The distinction is important because I am not
planning on setting forth specific reasons or more basic principles of
political morality to establish a justification for why the Constitution
should not prohibit the United States from joining with other nations
to form a world government.  Rather, I am hoping to show the range of
political standards that Americans already accept for making major
changes to their government structure, including constitutional
changes, is not exhausted by having to pass a constitutional
amendment.
Identifying which political standards might allow the United
States to join a world government is not an easy process.  History will
attest that public reason, a process Americans have enjoyed, at least
since the republic was founded, is what will identify those standards.
The famous American historian Alexis de Tocqueville “noted in the
early nineteenth century, while the ‘great democratic revolution’ oc-
curring then in Europe and America was ‘a new thing’, it [par-
ticipatory democracy] was also an expression of “the most continuous,
ancient, and permanent tendency known to history.’”20  Certainly, it
has been a constant challenge to authoritarianism.  But what is de-
mocracy?  History has shown—since many authoritarian nations like
North Korea claim large electoral results—that it is not just a demand
for public balloting, but what John Rawls has called “the exercise of
public reason”.21
18 Brys Tanner, Justification and Legitimacy: Two Concepts for Deliberative De-
mocracy (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wollongong) (abstract
available at http://conferences.arts.usyd.edu.au/viewpaper.php?id=806&print=1&
cf=16).
19 Id.
20 AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 323 (Harvard University Press 2009) (quot-
ing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 1, (George Lawrence trans.,
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1990).
21 SEN, supra note 20, at 324.  Amartya Sen notes:
Balloting alone can be thoroughly inadequate on its own, as is
abundantly illustrated by the astonishing electoral victories of
ruling tyrannies in authoritarian regimes in the past as well as
those in the present, for example in today’s North Korea.  The
difficulty lies not just in the political and punitive pressure that
is brought to bear on voters in the balloting itself, but in the way
expressions of public views are thwarted by censorship, informa-
tional exclusion and a climate of fear, along with the suppression
of political opposition and the independence of the media, and
the absence of basic civil rights and political liberties.
Id. at 327.
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Rawls writes “[t]he idea of public reason specifies at the deep-
est level the basic moral and political values that are to determine a
constitutional democratic government’s relation to its citizens and
their relation to one another.”22  Here, constitutional democratic gov-
ernment might encompass a global world order, provided it was itself
democratic.  Rawls goes on to elucidate the structure of public reason:
It has five different aspects: (1) the fundamental political
questions to which it applies; (2) the persons to whom it
applies (government officials and candidates for public
office); (3) its content as given by a family of reasonable
political conceptions of justice; (4) the application of
these concepts in discussions of coercive norms to be en-
acted in the form of legitimate law for a democratic peo-
ple; and (5) citizens checking that the principles derived
from their conceptions of justice satisfy the criterion of
reciprocity.23
Rawls’ idea of public reason seems particularly well suited to
operate in pluralistic societies that are democratic, i.e., societies where
people may have different philosophical or religious views of the world
and different moral conceptions of the good.24  Rawls himself notes:
[i]t is imperative to realize that the idea of public reason
does not apply to all political discussions of fundamental
principles, but only to discussions of those questions in
what I refer to as the public political forum.  This forum
maybe divided into three parts: the discourse of judges in
their decisions, and especially the judges of the supreme
court; the discourse of government officials, especially
chief executives and legislators; the discourse of candi-
dates for public office and their campaign managers, es-
pecially in their public oratory, party platforms, and
political statements.25
The idea of using public reason as an explanation of democracy
has also been advanced by Ju¨rgen Habermas.26  Habermas provides a
more procedural exposition than Rawls, although Amartya Sen be-
lieves the differences may be deceptive.27  Habermas, for example, dis-
agrees with Rawls’s “priority of liberal rights [including liberty of
belief and conscience, the protection of life, personal liberty, and prop-
22 JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 574 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
23 Id. at 574-75.
24 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 213-14 (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1993).
25 RAWLS, supra note 22, at 575.
26 See SEN, supra note 20, at 324
27 See id. at 325.
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erty] which [Habermas believes] demotes the democratic process to an
inferior position.”28  However, Sen has noted that notwithstanding
their differences in approach, to the extent both Rawls and Habermas
have included a right to property, Rawls has never argued that the
right to property is an entitlement; it is more an incentive toward en-
hancing “the deal the worst-off receive.”29  Consequently, these two
world-class philosophers might not be as far apart as at first might
appear.30
More problematic, according to Sen, is Rawls’s starting ques-
tion: What constitutes perfectly just institutions as the point for all
further comparisons?31  This is problematic because it attempts a de-
ductive justification with which all may not agree.  Sen prefers a dif-
ferent question as his point of departure: How can justice be
advanced?32  The difference between the two positions recognizes that
there may be no prior agreement, “even under strict conditions of im-
partiality and open-minded scrutiny (for example, as identified by
Rawls in his ‘original position’) on the nature of the ‘just society.’”33
Consequently, “actual choice demands a framework of comparison of
justice for choosing among the feasible alternatives.”34  In contrast
with Rawls’s “transcendental institutionalism,” Sen prefers a “focus on
actual realizations and accomplishments, rather than only on the es-
tablishment of what are identified as the right institutions and
rules.”35
My point in referencing this debate is not to take one side or
the other on the ultimate question of justification.  Rather, my goal is
more tentative—to open the possibility for legitimation to arise by
means other than a straight forward deduction from basic principles or
already-established agreements without, at the same time, denying
the possibility of someday finding a transcendental deduction.  The
hope, of course, is that a partial approach will not produce inconsistent
results and that any well-established future theory of world govern-
ment will likely benefit from how various partial approaches have
helped us clarify along the way our most fundamental goals and aspi-
rations, as well as what we believe ought to constrain our efforts to
achieve them.  That said: How might such a more partial approach
function?
28 Id. at 325.
29 Id at 325 & n.
30 Id. at 9.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id..
34 Id.
35 Id. at 10.
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Here we might begin with how Sen sees freedom operating to
further “a significant aspect of human life.”  Sen has stated:
In noting the nature of human lives, we have rea-
son to be interested not only in the various things we
succeed in doing, but also in the freedoms we actually
have to choose between different kinds of lives.  The free-
dom to choose our lives can make a significant contribu-
tion to our well-being, but going beyond the perspective
of well-being, the freedom itself may be seen as impor-
tant.  Being able to reason and choose is a significant as-
pect of human life.  In fact, we are under no obligation to
seek our own well-being, and it is for us to decide what
we have good reason to pursue . . .36
Sen’s point here is not the simple utilitarian position of maxi-
mizing pleasure or minimizing pain, but seeing social realizations “in
context to the “capabilities people actually have.”37  His social choice
concern is with “measuring individual interests, values, or welfares as
an aggregate towards collective decision.”38  An example of such a col-
lective decision is passing a set of laws under a constitution.39  Free-
dom to choose gives the population the opportunity to decide what they
should do, and with that opportunity comes the responsibility for what
we do—to the extent that they are chosen actions.”40  Here compari-
sons of different positions can be a very helpful tool.  Freedom is not
just some pre-political liberal value, but neither is it, as the civic re-
publican might see it, the end of a process of democratic compromise.
It must flow between both points of view, since the democratic process
itself requires participation of free and equal citizens.  Freedom
emerges as a necessary element of the discourse that brings this pro-
cess to life.  It can help afford legitimacy to a choice, even though the
choice is not fully theorized.  For by a process of comparison, one is free
to rank alternatives, even if not absolutely, to see which one might
appear to be the better.  And if one is at all empirical—by considering
not only how different choices effect other peoples lives, but also rank-
ing those choices to support well-being as well—the result will have
positive normative significance.  Obviously, there is no single formula
36 Id. at 18.
37 Id. at 19.
38 Id.
39 KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 106 (John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. 1966).  It should be noted that Social Choice Theory is not the same as
Public Choice Theory.  The later reflects a more utilitarian/preference approach to
decision-making, while the former takes into account relevant norms and ways
different decisions impact human life.
40 See SEN, supra note 20, at 19.
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for identifying a choice based on public reason.  It manifests itself
when enough people, after having deliberated, decide upon a position
it would be futile for others to continue to dispute.  As Sen is noted to
have said:  “it should not be difficult to say that Emperor Nero’s gain
from burning Rome did not outweigh the loss of the rest of the
Romans.”41
I want to suggest that especially at the political level such par-
tial orderings, in the absence of a more fully theorized position, are not
only not uncommon, but also often lead to wide-ranging acceptance for
changes in the political order.  Indeed, one of the most illustrative ex-
amples of this, that may also provide a precedent for the United States
someday becoming part of a world government, is found in the debates
leading to the adoption of the American constitution.  As will be seen,
not only did those debates underscore an external process that would
lead to the federal Constitution becoming supreme over state
supremacy clauses, but they also lead to limitations being placed on
federal supremacy in service to various outside values necessary to ob-
tain the support of the American people.  None of this was derived by
any transcendental deduction.  All of it came from thinking through
the failures in the Articles of Confederation, combined with back-
ground learning regarding politics and economics and how in both an-
cient and modern times various efforts had been made to construct
working republics that could effectively provide for the common
good.42
IV. THE HISTORY OF U.S. CONSTITUTION’S SUPREMACY
CLAUSE
What meaning did the founders assign to the supremacy
clause?  Of note is that the clause did not gain too much attention—no
discussion or dissent—when it was first proposed on July 17, 1787 by
Luther Martin, the delegate from Maryland to the Philadelphia Con-
vention to replace the more controversial Madison/Pickney proposal
that Congress “be empowered to veto state legislation.”43  The original
Martin language uses “supreme law of the several states” along with
some other wording that was changed first by the Committee on Detail
and later by the Committee on Style to the current wording “supreme
41 AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 99 (C.J. Bliss &
M.D. Intriligator eds., Elsevier 1984)
42 See generally FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 56-142 (1985).
43 Id. at 255 (citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 28-29
(Max Farrand ed., 1937)).
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law of the land,” which was actually completed after the Convention
had adopted the provision on August 23, 1787.44
Initially, it appears that the founders expected the supremacy
clause to apply only against the states.  The historian Forrest McDon-
ald notes that the original Madison/Pickney language afforded the
Congress the power “to veto state legislation,”45 thus making the Con-
stitution dominant over the states.46  Luther Martin’s new language
substituted for this congressional veto that “the constitution, acts of
Congress passed in pursuance of it, and treaties be ‘the supreme law of
the respective States . . . & that the Judiciaries of the several state
shall be bound thereby in their decisions, anything in the respective
laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding.’”47  Ac-
cording to McDonald, this change implied that judges “were to apply
the test of constitutionality to state legislation.”48  Subsequently, how-
ever, the language was further modified, “from ‘Judiciaries of the sev-
eral States’ (which would include juries) to ‘the judges in the several
States,’ which excluded juries but can be read as including national as
well as state judges”49
Madison seems to have preferred the original Madison/Pickney
language that would have made the Constitution supreme over the
states by allowing the Congress to review acts of state law to see if
they conformed to the federal Constitution.50  Apparently, he was less
sure that the courts, rather than Congress, would be able to reign in
the states, given their own state constitutional supremacy clauses that
would now be under the authority of the federal government.  In a let-
ter to Jefferson, dated October 24, 1787, Madison “tacitly confirmed
this interpretation . . . and repeated his belief that the [Martin] substi-
tution would prove to be inadequate.”51  However, the history of judi-
cial review has since shown the courts to be well adept to affirm, where
constitutionally prescribed, the powers of the federal government over
44 Id. (citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 389 (Max Far-
rand ed., 1937)).
45 Id. at 255.
46 Id.
47 Id. (citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 28-29 (Max Far-
rand ed., 1937)).
48 Id.
49 Id. (citing THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 183 (Max Far-
rand ed., 1937)).
50 See id. at 275-76.
51 Id. at 276 (citing Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24,
1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 1787-1788, at 205-20 (Robert A. Rut-
land ed., 1977)).
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the states, and thus to affirm the supremacy of the federal
Constitution.52
Perhaps the best insight into what the founders originally in-
tended by the provision is found in the Federalist Papers, a set of argu-
ments by writers of the Constitution of 1787 urging ratification by the
states.53  In THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, for example, Alexander Hamilton
explains how the new Constitution would affect the sovereignty of the
states:
It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws
of the confederacy as to the enumerated and legitimate
objects of its jurisdiction will become the SUPREME
LAW of the land; to the observance of which all officers,
legislative, executive, and judicial in each state will be
bound by the sanctity of an oath.  Thus the legislatures,
courts, and magistrates, of the respective members, will
be incorporated into the operations of the national gov-
ernment as far as its just and constitutional authority ex-
tends; and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement
of its laws.54
The footnote following this quoted passage warrants particular
attention because Hamilton says: “The sophistry which has been em-
ployed to show that this will tend to the destruction of the State gov-
ernments will, in its proper place, be fully detected.”55  Clearly,
Hamilton envisioned that the creation of a national government would
not destroy existing state governments, but would only curtail their
individual sovereignty by creating a further set of duties for state of-
ficers, above and beyond their state responsibilities, necessary to com-
ply with their new federal responsibilities.  In situations where state
and national positions would conflict, provided the Constitution had
assigned power to the national government, state officers would be
obliged to fulfill their federal responsibility over their state responsi-
bility, because a federal constitutional responsibility would now be su-
preme over a state constitutional responsibility.  Also, identifying
situations where this deference would be needed would be the respon-
52 E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.  137, 177-78 (1803).
53 The Articles of Confederation were thought to be too weak to meet the needs of
the young nation because they provided for no executive and required unanimity
of the states for any change, At the time the Convention first met in 1787, its
charge was to propose amendments to the Articles that would strengthen the
young nation’s ability to regulate relations among the states and foreign govern-
ments.  It quickly became apparent that amendments would not work and a to-
tally new organization of the nation was needed. See MCDONALD, supra 42, at 213.
54 THE FEDERALIST No. 27, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
55 Id. at 146 n. *.
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sibility of the federal courts, as provided for under the new Constitu-
tion.56  Thus, the Constitution reigns down the federal power over the
states, but only to the extent that it has assigned certain powers to the
national government.
In responding to both attacks against the “necessary and
proper clause” as well as the “supremacy clause,” Hamilton, in Feder-
alist 33, again considers what actual power these two clauses convey to
the federal government.  Here he states:
These two clauses have been the source of much
virulent invective and petulant declamation against the
proposed Constitution.  They have been held up to the
people in all the exaggerated colors of misrepresentation
as the pernicious engines by which their local govern-
ments were to be destroyed and their liberties extermi-
nated; as the hideous monster whose devouring jaws
would spare neither sex nor age, nor high nor low, nor
sacred nor profane; and yet strange as it may appear, af-
ter all this clamor, to those who may not have happened
to contemplate them in the same light, it may be af-
firmed with perfect confidence that the constitutional op-
eration of the intended government would be precisely
the same if these clauses were entirely obliterated as if
they were repeated in every article.  They are only de-
claratory of a truth which would have resulted by neces-
sary and unavoidable implication from the very act of
constituting a federal government and vesting it with
certain specified powers.57
Here Hamilton makes explicit what is already implied by the
creation of a national government with limited powers, namely, that
when acting within the scope of those powers, the national government
is supreme over state law.  Also key is the fact that the national gov-
ernment has no broader power to act than what the Constitution has
vested in it.  Since it was never intended that the national government
would replace the state governments, claims of state government oblit-
eration are thus without justification.
What is justified, by ratification of the Constitution, is that
powers previously assigned to the states, now are assigned to the fed-
eral government.  But, Hamilton also wanted to make clear that law
established by the people of the several states, was not a treaty among
the several states, which declared that a national government with
56 U.S. CONST. art. III.
57 THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 173 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA ed., 2009).
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certain designated powers would operate over the states.  To make this
explicit, he writes:
[I]t is said that the laws of the Union are to be the
supreme law of the land.  What inference can be drawn
from this, or what would they amount to, if they were not
to be supreme?  It is evident they would amount to noth-
ing.  A LAW, by the very meaning of the term, includes
supremacy.  It is rule which those to whom it is pre-
scribed are bound to observe.  This results from every po-
litical association.  If individuals enter into a state of
society, the laws of that society must be the supreme reg-
ulator of their conduct.  If a number of political societies
enter into a larger political society, the laws which the
latter may enact, pursuant to the powers intrusted to it
by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over
those societies and the individuals of whom they are
composed.  It would otherwise be a mere treaty, depen-
dent on the good faith of the parties, and not a govern-
ment, which is only another word for POLITICAL
POWER AND SUPREMACY.58
The idea that constitutionally assigned powers to the national
government must be supreme over state constitutional supremacy
clauses is also supported by James Madison.  In Federalist 44,
Madison responded to the frequent attacks by Anti-federalists over the
shifting of power from states to the federal government.  Here he iden-
tifies three potential areas of national weakness if the constitutional
assignment of powers to the national government were subject to state
constitutional supremacy clauses:
In the first place, as these constitutions invest
the State legislatures with absolute sovereignty in all
cases not excepted by the existing Articles of Confedera-
tion, all the authorities contained in the proposed Consti-
tution, so far as they exceed those enumerated in the
Confederation, would have been annulled, and the new
Congress would have been reduced to the same impotent
condition with their predecessors.
In the next place, as the constitutions of some of
the States do not even expressly and fully recognize the
existing powers of the Confederacy, an express saving of
the supremacy of the former would, in such States, have
brought into question every power contained in the pro-
posed Constitution.
58 Id.
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In the third place, as the constitutions of the
States differ much from each other, it might happen that
a treaty or national law of great and equal importance to
the States would interfere with some and not with other
constitutions, and would consequently be valid in some
of the States at the same time it would have no effect in
others.
In fine, the world would have seen, for the first
time, a system of government founded on an inversion of
the fundamental principles of all government; it would
have seen the authority of the whole society everywhere
subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have
seen a monster, in which the head was under the direc-
tion of the members.59
The aforementioned comments by Hamilton and Madison are
worth noting because they directly engage a number of the themes of
this essay.  First is Hamilton’s acknowledgement that in creating a hi-
erarchy of political associations, the greater dominates the lesser.  Sec-
ond is Madison’s suggestion that the greater association comes about
not by its conformity to the constitutions of the lesser associations, as
was true of the Congress under the Articles, but by the people of the
several states.  Otherwise, similarly to the Articles, the Constitution
would have little power over the states, especially those whose consti-
tutional supremacy clauses did not “fully recognize the existing powers
of the Confederacy.”60  Third is Madison and Hamilton’s mutual con-
cern that the national government should arise through an arrange-
ment that does not require the unanimous consent of all the states.
This latter acknowledgement is particularly important as it suggests a
limit to state constitutional supremacy clauses.  No state, on its own,
can trump the collective will of all or even most of the others.  As Arti-
cle VII provides, states that had not chosen to ratify the federal Consti-
tution once the requisite number of nine had done so, would not be
part of the new United States.61  In addition, they would not be enti-
tled, as they were under the Articles, to prevent the other states from
entering into the federal union.62  The arrow of determination is thus
from the collection that makes up the larger association down to the
members that make it up, and not the reverse.
59 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 175 (James Madison) (ABA ed., 2009).
60 Id.
61 U.S. CONST. art. VII.
62 Id. (stating that “The ratification of the conventions of nine states, shall be suf-
ficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the states so ratifying
the same.”).
358 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 9:4
To ensure that this would be the case, and to show that the
people of the several states were the groundwork for the new Constitu-
tion, thereby providing it legitimacy, Madison, too, gives prominence
to the oath requirement that state judges will be obligated to take:
The members of the federal government will have no
agency in carrying the State constitutions into effect.
The members and officers of the State governments, on
the contrary, will have an essential agency in giving ef-
fect to the federal Constitution.63
Here it is significant to note that the founders did not envision
the Constitution to take its authority from already existing state con-
stitutions, but from the people of the several states directly.  This is
made clear by the fact that Article VI does not require the states to
rewrite their state constitutional supremacy clauses, but only requires
that the judges in every state be bound by oath to the federal Constitu-
tion thereby suggesting that previously supreme state constitutions
would now be subject to federal constraint.
As further support for the idea that the Constitution does not
derive its authority from the states, Article VII declares that ratifica-
tion by a convention in nine states “shall be sufficient for the Estab-
lishment of this Constitution between the states so ratifying the
same.”  Thus, even the authority to ratify the proposed Constitution
itself, let alone its authority to operate once ratified, is deemed from
the outset to derive not from any agreement among the states, as it
does under the Articles, but from the people of the United States.  It
can thus be inferred that the founders foresaw the federal Constitution
trumping state supremacy clauses by its very inception, beginning
with the process of its own ratification.  This suggests that the prior
sovereignty of states was now constrained to matters not delegated by
the Constitution to the national government.  But, what is con-
straining the states to establish the Constitution after only nine
states, as opposed to all thirteen, as required under the Articles, have
ratified it?  Apparently, the founders believed it was an inalienable
right of the people of the several states to declare the form of
government.
This social contract justification for the federal Constitution is
made even more poignant when one considers the way the Constitu-
tion came into being.  Initially, the delegates to the Philadelphia Con-
vention of 1787 were authorized to propose amendments that might
63 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 257 (James Madison) (ABA ed., 2009). It is interest-
ing to note the historical development of the federal government in which a num-
ber of departments and agencies have moved toward creating their own
enforcement apparatus and away from relying on state officers to carry out their
will.
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rectify deficiencies in the Articles of Confederation.  Among the defects
were no provision for repayment of debts to foreigners and  to the na-
tion’s citizens contracted during the Revolutionary War; no provision
for repossession of valuable territories and important posts held by for-
eign powers, which by expressed stipulation in the Treaty of Peace at
Paris ought to have been surrendered to the new nation; no ability to
repel an outside aggression against the union of states or assert a na-
tional right against Spain to navigate the Mississippi; and no capacity
to regulate commerce among the several states, to coin money, or bor-
row on the credit of the United States.64
However, as these matters were discussed, the framers soon
realized that the problem was with the Articles themselves.  In partic-
ular, not only did the Articles of Confederation not provide for an exec-
utive to carry out the law, but it required unanimity among the states
for any amendments.65  Only if all thirteen states agreed could the Ar-
ticles be amended.  Under the proposed Constitution, by contrast, not
only would many of the aforementioned issues be attended to by spe-
cific stipulation, but also the Constitution itself would be established
between the states that had ratified it, as soon as nine states had done
so.66  Additionally, the framers sought to avoid any subsequent criti-
cism that adoption of the Constitution in this manner might lack the
required unanimity of the states.  McDonald describes the framers’ an-
ticipation of such a criticism and what had to be done to avoid it, as
follows:
In a resolution appended to the Constitution and “laid
before [the Confederation] Congress,” the convention rec-
ommended that Congress forward the document to the
states and that “it should afterwards be submitted to a
Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the
People thereof, under the Recommendation of its Legisla-
ture, for their Assent and Ratification.”  Congress unani-
mously resolved to follow that recommendation, and the
legislatures of all thirteen states voted to abide by it.  In
so doing, Congress and the legislatures approved Article
VII of the Constitution and thereby constructively
64 THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 76-77 (Alexander Hamilton) (ABA ed., 2009).
65 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII, para. 1 (stating “Every State
shall abide by the determinations of the united States in congress assembled, on
all questions by which this confederation are submitted to them.  And the articles
of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union
shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of
them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the united States, and be
afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.”).
66 U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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amended the Articles of Confederation in regard to the
amendment process; and they did so in accordance with
the stipulations in the Articles themselves.67
Even if a unanimously adopted resolution of the Confederation
Congress to which all thirteen states subsequently agreed would be
sufficient to amend the Articles, the idea that a single resolution
should open the door to the creation of a very different form of national
government must give one pause.  For the result hoped for by virtually
all of the Federalists was not that the Articles of Confederation would
be amended, for that would have kept the same form of government
that they had found so unworkable.  The Federalists sought a new re-
publican form of federated government that had never been envisioned
by the drafters of the Articles.  McDonald’s own description of the Res-
olution as a “constructive amendment” suggests that what the Resolu-
tion sought to do would never fully suffice to explain how so radical a
departure from the government under the Articles could now be taking
place.68
In effect, the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention were
recommending to the Congress and to the people of the United States a
form of government never before undertaken.  Just proposing to the
whole people of the United States a Constitution with a strong, though
limited, central government—which had not existed under the Arti-
cles—in itself was revolutionary.  The proposed resolution that would
ultimately be relied upon to amend the Articles emphasized just how
much the new Constitution affronted the idea of unanimous agree-
ment upon which the Articles were based.  This document represents a
social contract between the national government and the whole people,
rather than between the national government and the thirteen sover-
eign states.69  And the supreme authority of the Constitution is estab-
lished not by words, but by the willingness of the people to accept a
national authority to operate over the states.
Needless to say, the Anti-Federalists who opposed adoption of
the Constitution viewed the supremacy clause with great suspicion.
67 MCDONALD, supra note 42, at 279 (quoting Farrand, Reclords, 2:665).  Thereaf-
ter, any further amendment to the new Constitution would have to be first pro-
posed by either two-thirds of both houses of Congress or after two-thirds of the
legislatures of the several states called forth a convention to propose amendments,
and in either case the proposed amendment would need to be ratified by three-
fourths of the several states to become part of the Constitution. See also U.S.
CONST. art. V.
68 The Articles, for example, did not envision a tripartite central government with
its own executive and judicial authority.
69 Exactly how strong the bond of union was would be tested seventy-five years
later in a bloody civil war.
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An efficient federal government need not, how-
ever, imply one so powerful as that proposed in the Con-
stitution.  The broad grants of power, taken together
with the “supremacy” and “necessary and proper”
clauses, amounted, the Anti-Federalists contended, to an
unlimited grant of power to the general government to do
whatever it might choose to do.70
70 HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 28-29 (University of Chicago
Press 1981).
Moreover, the Anti-Federalists insisted, in contradiction to their
opponents, that the powers of the proposed government, not its
organization, was the central question. All of the arguments of
the Federalists that this new government was better constructed
than the old one fell before the massive fact that the old govern-
ment was weak and this one would be strong.  “The Old Confed-
eration is so defective in point of power,” William Grayson
plaintively explained to the Virginia convention, “that no danger
can result from creating offices under it; because those who hold
them cannot be paid. . .. Why not make this system as secure as
that, in this respect?”  Not many Anti-Federalists were quite so
transparent, but their opponents were quick to insist that Gray-
son’s position was precisely the ridiculous conclusion to which
the Anti-Federalists argument led: without the power to do good,
a government can do no harm.  But a government must have the
capacity to accomplish its ends, otherwise liberty itself is in dan-
ger: “there is no way more likely to lose ones liberty in the end
than being too niggardly of it in the beginning. . . .” The means,
the Federalists argued again and again, must be proportioned to
the end, and the end in the case of the general government is not
capable of being limited in advance.  As bounds cannot be set to a
nation’s wants, so bounds ought not to be set to its resources.
“The contingencies of society are not reducible to calculations.
They cannot be fixed, or bounded, even in imagination.”
The framers of constitutions must see that “no power should
be wanting which the safety of the community requires.”  Other-
wise, when critical occasions arise, the country will suffer the al-
ternative of usurpation or catastrophe.  Of course, every power
can be abused, and abuse must be guarded against; but “our risk
of this evil [is] one of the conditions of the imperfect state of
human nature, where there is no good without the mixture of
some evil.”  Publius [the name that the authors—Hamilton,
Madison, and Jay—of the Federalists Papers were writing under,
then] drove the point home:
For the absurdity must continually stare us in the face of
confiding to a government the direction of the most essential na-
tional interests, without daring to trust it to the authorities
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Their arguments sought to make the public question whether this new
form of government really was wanted, implying that it would be the
people that finally would be deciding the question.  Here it is impor-
tant to acknowledge that “public” meant free, property-owning white
males.  Still, these were the individuals who would create the new na-
tion.  Implicit in even the Anti-Federalist criticism was the acknowl-
edgement that in the end it would be the people (so understood) who
would decide the type of government to adopt.
Arguments of the Anti-Federalists that the new national gov-
ernment would undermine their liberties gave the public pause.  Just
six years before, the United States of America and the Kingdom of
Great Britain signed the Treaty of Peace that ended the American
Revolutionary War and granted sovereign independence to the new
nation.  Americans (though they seldom would describe themselves as
such) held well in their memories the abuses that had occurred under
British rule, and which led them to fight a war for independence from
Great Britain.  Many of these abuses—especially what were perceived
as violations by the British Crown of their rights as Englishmen to
liberty, property, and representation in Parliament—are set forth in
the Declaration of Independence.  Many Americans believed, at the
time, these abuses warranted their final step toward separation.  And
so, when the Constitution was proposed to offset the endemic inabili-
ties of the Confederation Congress to resolve problems faced by the
country, the citizens of the young nation were concerned whether this
proposed cure would prove more harmful than the disease.
Increasingly, however, the citizens were also becoming aware
that the current situation under the Articles was not sustainable.  And
so, they adopted a compromise to insure the legitimacy of the new gov-
ernment and to offset fears of usurpation and tyranny given the cen-
tralization of power.  Under the agreement, the first Congress meeting
under the new Constitution would propose a Bill of Rights to the states
for ratification as amendments to the Constitution, which became the
first ten amendments to the new Constitution in 1791.71  Basically, the
Bill of Rights would limit the power of the new national government in
which are indispensable to their power and efficient manage-
ment.  Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions, but firmly
embrace a rational alternative.
Id.
71 See generally RICHARD  LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, (2006) (discussing Madison’s proposal of the Bill of Rights and the
conflict regarding the protection of human liberties between the Federalists and
Anti-Federalists, and the difficulty faced by the Philadelphia Convention to ratify
the Constitution).
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which it was hoped the public would find solace from the fear
tyranny.72
The agreement for a Bill of Rights added to the Constitution a
set of limits to the power of the national government.  Politically, it
established the legitimacy of the new Constitution by limiting the new
government to respect the basic freedoms of the public.  Here it is im-
portant to see that the young Republic did not start out with the view
that the Constitution would be first adopted, and then, if needed, a Bill
of Rights would be added later. Rather, it started out with the under-
standing that a needed national government would be created, but
that it would be limited almost from the outset by a Bill of Rights pro-
tecting individual liberties.  It may not have been completely clear
which rights would be included, although some involving basic liber-
ties of the person, including rights to freedom of religion, speech, and
freedom of the press, along with guarantees of property, and provision
for states to retain some sovereign rights, were certainly to be in-
cluded.73  As a consequence, the public could view ratification of the
Constitution as the outcome of a debate in which the free, property-
owning white male citizens of the time could come to the view that
72 The amendments comprising the Bill of Rights that would limit any overreach-
ing federal power are the following:  The First Amendment bans state establish-
ment of religion and acknowledges individual freedoms of speech, press, assembly,
religious worship, and the right to peacefully petition the government for griev-
ances.  The Second Amendment establishes the right to keep and bear arms.  The
Third Amendment establishes protection against the forced quartering of soldiers
in private homes during times of peace.  The Fourth Amendment provides the
right of the people to be secure in their person, papers, and effects.  The Fifth
Amendment  requires due process of law before one can be denied life, liberty, or
property for an offense; it also protects against double jeopardy and being forced to
testify against oneself in a court of law. The Sixth Amendment provides for a
speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, the right to cross-examine opposing
witnesses, to have a lawyer and to be able to present friendly witnesses. The Sev-
enth Amendment provides for trial by jury in civil suits.  The Eighth Amendment
provides against excessive bail or fines or imposition of cruel and unusual punish-
ments.  The Ninth Amendment acknowledges that the rights enumerated in the
Constitution shall not be understood to limit other rights that may be held by the
people.  Finally, the Tenth and last Amendment to be adopted from the original
Bill of Rights provides:  “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respec-
tively, or to the people.” See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
73 “The proposed first Article, dealing with the number and apportionment of U.S.
Representatives, never became part of the Constitution.  The second Article, limit-
ing the power of Congress to increase salaries of its members, was ratified two
centuries later as the 27th Amendment.” RevolutionaryWarandBeyond.com, His-
tory of the Bill of Rights, http://www.revolutionary-war-and-beyond.com/history-
bill-of-rights.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2010).
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their public reason to form a new nation would respect their basic
rights.
The ratification process itself made clear that there would be
conditions on the new Constitution that would constrain its supremacy
by preventing the new government from having too much latitude to
interpret what powers had been given to it.  These conditions set
boundaries on federal lawmaking that were intended to protect some
states’ rights and the rights of the people to liberty.  But an interesting
question arises of whether their existence does not also support my
conclusion that by the end of the process of compromise and ratifica-
tion, the view of federal supremacy held by the founders was that set
out in my directional thesis establishing only some authority over the
states, rather than my starburst thesis claiming authority writ large.74
For the people were now deciding to adopt a federal Constitution
whose authority was simultaneously acknowledged both to be supreme
over the states, yet limited in its actions by the Bill of Rights.
V. FOUNDATIONS
This essay has operated on the assumption that the foundation
of the American Constitution resides in a social compact with the
American people.  That view now needs to be made more precise to
avoid a possible misleading implication.  It is the case that the foun-
ders did adopt a social compact theory of government.  But it was
neither a pure contract with the American people nor a pure contract
with the states.  On the one hand, the founders recognized the individ-
ual sovereignties of the existing thirteen United States for the purpose
of having ratification by state rather than a general vote of the Ameri-
can people.  In this, they were affording deference to the current ar-
rangement of the government under the Articles.  On the other hand,
they specified that each state was to choose delegates to a ratification
convention for that state, which would then vote on whether to accept
the Constitution.75
74 The difference between the two theses, is that the directional thesis expressly
limits the Constitution’s authority to the hierarchy established by only “the Ameri-
can legal system,” “all else being equal.”
75 The Articles of Confederation (ratified 1781) had declared: “each state retains,
its sovereignty, freedom, and independence.”  The treaty of peace (1783) that for-
mally ended the Revolutionary War states in Article 1: “His Britannic Majesty
acknowledges the said United States, viz., New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay,
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Georgia, to be free sovereign and independent states.” MCDONALD, supra note
42, at 150.  So, there was serious ground for the view, originally proposed by Dela-
ware Delegate Dickenson for “a mixed [governmental] system, partly national, and
partly federal.  In which one branch of Congress would ‘be drawn immediately
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The choice to use the convention procedure grew out of a fear
that a constitution ratified directly by the legislatures of the several
states might be viewed as a treaty among the states—allowing all
states to withdraw whenever any state breaches the agreement.
Whereas, a Constitution drawn from a vote in convention, even if indi-
vidual states had their legislature choose the delegates, would re-
present a compact with the American people, since the convention
process would be outside the normal operations of state government.
Indeed, Madison, in the first week of the Philadelphia convention,
urged, “that the Constitution be submitted to ‘the supreme authority
of the people themselves.’”76  Consequently, Article VII provides: “The
Ratifications of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for
the establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying
the same.”77
The reason for not submitting the Constitution to the American
people as a whole was to avoid possible criticism that the founders
were effectively trying to favor states with larger populations and try-
ing to force smaller states to abide by the decisions of the larger states.
As further support that the founders were not attempting to side with
larger states, after the Constitution would be ratified by nine states, it
would go into effect only in those nine states;78 the remaining states
would remain independent sovereignties until they  decided whether
or not to ratify the Constitution.  This also gives strength to the idea
that a larger association (federal government) is not imposing its will
on smaller already existing societies (states), as some have argued, but
rather that each state has determined on its own in convention—
though not by its own constitutional authority—whether to be part of
the larger association.79  This should, however, not be misread to sug-
from the people’ and the other would represent the states and be elected by state
legislatures for long terms.” Id. at 215.
76 Id. at 279-80 (citing Farrand, Records, June 5, 1:122-23).
77 U.S CONST. art. VII.
78 Forrest McDonald is particularly concerned to make this point because adop-
tion of the Constitution would amend “each of the state constitutions in a number
of ways” and he did not think the framers intended to make it appear as if “the
people in some states were altering the political societies and constitutions of
other states.” MCDONALD, supra note 42, at 280.
79 McDonald cites Herbert Storing for the alternative, disagreeing where Storing
“argues that the ratification procedure rested on the ‘assumption that the Ameri-
can states are several political wholes . . . but are, and always were from the mo-
ment of their separation from the King of England, parts of one whole.’”
McDonald responds that notwithstanding the Preamble to the Constitution, which
states “We the People of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this Consti-
tution,” the fact that the Constitution had to “be submitted for ratification by each
of the thirteen political societies, which is to say by the people of the several states
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gest that it was the established constitutional governments of the indi-
vidual states rather than the American people that gave rise to the
national government coming into being.  Herein lies an important dif-
ference in the way state sovereignty is treated under the Constitution
versus the way it was treated under the Articles.
According to Article VII, ratification would be achieved by an
affirmative vote by convention in nine states rather than in all thirteen
existing state legislatures, as provided for under the Articles.80  The
Constitution, in effect, bypasses state constitutional procedures by ap-
pealing directly to the people of the various states to secure its ratifica-
tion suggesting that state sovereignty was certainly not supreme in the
way Thesis One might suggest.81  While it would be wrong to interpret
this to mean that state legislatures would have no voice in the recom-
mendation or selection of delegates or that now the people in each
state would vote on ratification, it does signify that it is the people of
the individual states, acting through the Constitution’s mandated con-
vention process, who are proffering the means for altering existing al-
legiances.82  In this, as Storing has noted, the Constitution’s
preamble—in saying “We the People”—is acknowledging a very differ-
ent understanding of state sovereignty from that expressed under the
Articles, which begins with a listing of all the states.83
This difference in preamble language is not inconsequential.
What it implies when connected to Article VII is an adjustment to the
original Social Compact understanding of John Locke84 that might
have fitted the existing American arrangement between the Declara-
tion of Independence in 1776 and the adoption of the Articles in
in their capacities as people of the several states,” “unmistakably implied that the
source of sovereignty was the people of the states and that the residue of sover-
eignty that was committed neither to the national/federal nor to the state govern-
ments remained in them—an implication that was subsequently made explicit by
the Tenth Amendment.” MCDONALD, supra note 42, at 280 (citing HERBERT STOR-
ING, COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 1:12-14, notes at 1:82 (University Press of Kan-
sas 1985)).
80 Id.
81 My point here is not to say each state had a constitutional procedure for ratify-
ing a national constitution.  Rather, the states spoke through the organs which the
state constitutions assigned.  Thus, by having the Convention assign via its adop-
tion of Article VII a common convention procedure for ratification, the Convention
was in effect bypassing traditional state constitutional authorities.
82 MCDONALD, supra note 42, at 279-80.
83 Id. at 280-81 (citing HERBERT STORING, COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, 1:12-14,
notes at 1:82 (University Press of Kansas 1985)).
84 Under the Lockean view, the social “compact was between the people on the one
side, and the prince, sovereign, or rulers on the other.” MCDONALD, supra note 42,
at 280.
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1781.85  Locke’s idea is pre-political, starting from a state of nature
and developing from there a political society.86  The founders’ idea was
that the people of already existing societies (states) could agree for
their society to enter into a greater union or association, according to
terms set from outside their society, provided those terms were suffi-
ciently democratic to be acceptable to the people within those already
existing societies.  In one sense, state constitutional officers would be
involved in the making of the decision to ratify the federal Constitu-
tion, even though their authority to do so was unlikely to be subscribed
in any existing state constitutions.
The significance of this point is to undercut a potential objec-
tion to applying my Second Thesis to the United States becoming part
of a world government, namely, that first this would require amending
the federal Constitution.  The state legislature selection of delegates to
the ratifying convention was not likely to have been mentioned as a
possible legislative power in any state constitution.  As I have else-
where suggested, affiliation to a world body might also be done by the
treaty process.87  This last point should not be underrated.  What the
analysis shows is that a national constitutional order can be side-
stepped, but only provided that the people of that order view any alter-
native process as legitimate.88  If the founders’ design for the
American states is any indication of what other democratic states
might agree to (depending on their own individual histories and tradi-
tions), this process might be accomplished by means of a convention
process in each nation-state in which the people of that nation, either
directly or through specially assigned delegations, decide whether to
become part of a greater global government.  It also might be achieved
85 The compact would now be viewed as “among existing societies [not even among
the whole people as Storing suggested], which were themselves, according to the
Lockean principle, indissoluble—a principle that is explicitly confirmed in the
Constitution itself by the provision in article 4, section 3, which prevents the
states from being divided without their consent, and is implicitly confirmed by
article 5, which exempts equal suffrage by states in the Senate from the possibility
of amendment.” MCDONALD, supra note 42, at 281.
86 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True
Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government Nos. 95, 96, in TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 374-75 (Cambridge University Press 1960).
87 See Vincent J. Samar, The Treaty Power and the Supremacy Clause: Rethinking
Reid v. Covert in a Global Context , 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV 287 (2010).
88 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 41 (Harvard University
Press, 1991).  An interesting example of this is how the Franklin D. Roosevelt ad-
ministration was able to bypass the constitutional amendment process through
successive reelections and a public angry at suffering a depression to get the Su-
preme Court to accept creation of the regulatory/social welfare state where previ-
ously the libertarian freedom of contract model dominated.
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by a series of different methods suited to the particular histories and
traditions of the societies involved.
What Article VII has shown is the possibility of acting outside
existing state constitutional procedures, which now might be extended
to nation-states, so long as the process engenders the respect of the
respective country.  What cannot be eliminated from the equation is
that the process be seen as legitimate.  And that legitimacy must be
understood dually: it must be manifested both in the larger group’s
recognition that what has emerged is a decision of the people of several
independent political societies, and in the joining societies’ acceptance
of the process adopted, as a legitimate means for entering into such a
contract.  Madison’s idea of submitting the question of ratification to
the conventions of the several states, combined with effectuation upon
the recognition of nine states without first altering the various state
constitutions, provides support for a future similar procedure to be fol-
lowed at the global level, but does not exhaust all the possibilities.89
In the end, if such a world order is to come about it will have to
be based on how associations come to be seen as legitimate by the pub-
lic in the various countries uniting.  This will come about when citi-
zens in their respective societies come to see that many of the issues of
environment, economy, terrorism, and so forth, are not all that differ-
ent from the issues other societies confront, and begin to ask not just
what would be the best system to have ideally, but what choices they
might now make to not only advance the freedom and well-being of the
people in their respective society, but together advance the freedom
and well-being that might be possible for all the world’s people.  Notice
I do not say what choices might maximize freedom and well-being for,
at operational level of law, these general rights are the property of all
human beings.  Consequently, human rights constraints must accom-
pany the more traditional cost/benefit/utility evaluation in making any
such decision.  Because the way these elements advance the decision
may be only partly theorized, it may not be possible to fully predict in
advance what result will be reached.  But if public reason has oc-
curred, it should be possible to establish that significant attention was
paid to these various elements because their role in both the process
and final outcome is evident.
89 What differentiates this approach is that it does not try to derive its final deter-
minations from a single political philosophy like the liberalism of John Locke that
seems to have motivated the Antifederalists or the Civic Republicanism of the Fed-
eralists, but instead seeks to put the two in dialogue along lines not too far distant
from Ju¨rgen Habermas’ “Discourse Approach”. See Ju¨rgen Habermas, Constitu-
tional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles 29 POL. THE-
ORY 766-81 (2001).
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VI. LIMITATIONS
The legitimacy of the American founding process presupposes
that those who are choosing know roughly their own interests and are
capable of entering into arrangements to protect those interests.  It
also presupposes that such choices do not necessarily end with just
establishing the next level of government, but continue on into the fu-
ture as society further expands its political relationships.  In short, the
people who would be voting on whether or not to accept any greater
governmental arrangement would be viewed as autonomous individu-
als90 capable of making their own decisions91 with knowledge of rele-
90 Immanuel Kant notes:
As a rational being and thus as belonging to the intelligible
world, man cannot think of the causality of his own will except
under the idea of freedom, for independence from the determin-
ing causes of the world of sense (an independence which reason
must always ascribe to itself) is freedom.  The concept of auton-
omy is inseparably connected with the idea of freedom, and with
the former there is inseparably bound the universal principle of
morality. . . .
IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 71 (Lewis White
Beck trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1959).  Kant is referring to his categorical imperative,
which in its second version—the one most relevant here—states: “Act so that you
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an
end and never as a means only.” Id. at 47.  By an end, Kant means as the author
of one’s own actions, as the source of one’s own purposes.  This is made clear when
earlier he says:
Now, I say, man and, in general, every rational being exists
as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily
used by this or that will. . . .  All objects of inclination have only a
conditional worth, for if the inclinations and needs founded on
them did not exist, their objects would be without worth. . . . Be-
ings whose existence does not depend on our will but on nature, if
they are not rational beings, have only relative worth as means
and are therefore called “things;” on the other hand, rational be-
ings are designated “persons” because their nature indicates that
they are ends in themselves, i.e., things which may not be used
merely as means.  Such a being is thus an object of respect and,
so far, restricts all [arbitrary] choice.
Id. at 46.
91 Alan Gewirth has noted:
For human behaviors or movements to be actions in the strict
sense and hence voluntary or free, certain causal conditions must
be fulfilled.  Negatively the behaviors must not occur from one or
more of the following kinds of cause: (a) direct compulsion, physi-
cal or psychological, by someone or something external to the
person; (b) causes internal to the person, such as reflexes, igno-
rance, or disease, that decisively contribute, in ways beyond his
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vant circumstances.92  Furthermore, this autonomy condition would
continue into the future, although it would now be partially con-
strained by the apparatus they had put into effect, as it was when the
Constitution replaced the Articles of Confederation.  But even if such
autonomy can be presupposed to exist initially, how could such self-
rule be guaranteed over time?
In the case of the adoption of the American Con-
stitution, the background was a set of rights to liberty
and property, and the right to vote (although not by all)
that many regarded as rights of Englishmen.93  Indeed,
it was the deliberate denial of these rights by the English
Crown prior to the Revolutionary war that was one of the
motivating forces behind adoption of a Bill of Rights.94
There was also a concern for maintaining a right of peti-
tion and of members of legislative assemblies to speak
control, to the occurrence f the behavior; (c) indirect compulsion
whereby the person’s choice to emit the behavior is forced by
someone else’s coercion.
ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 31 (University of Chicago Press 1978).
92 Gewirth further notes:
Positively, the person must control his behavior by his unforced
and informed choice.  This does not mean that whenever he
chooses to do something, he does it, for he may be unable to do it.
It means rather that when his behavior is voluntary or free, his
unforced and informed choice is the necessary and sufficient con-
dition of the behavior.  For all behaviors that are the objects of
moral and other precepts, it is assumed that the person ad-
dressed can control their behaviors in this way.  When there is
such control, the person chooses on the basis of informed reasons
he has for acting as he does.  Among other things, he knows what
action he is performing, for what purpose, its proximate outcome,
and his recipients.  The self, person, or agent to whom the choices
belong may be viewed as an organized system of dispositions in
which such informed reasons are coherently interrelated with
other desires and choices.  Insofar as the person’s behavior de-
rives from this system, it is the person who controls his behavior
by his unforced choice, so that it is voluntary.
Id.
93 Unfortunately, the founders did not perceive the need to grant to vote to African
slaves, women, or, in several states, to persons who did not own property.
94 Before the Revolutionary War, there had been a series of complaints against
the British Crown including total forfeiture of property for commission of a felony,
especially since previous “articles against excessive fines” could be found “in
Magna Carta, in the statute of 1 Westminster, c. 30, and in the 1689 English Bill
of Rights.” See MCDONALD, supra note 42, at 21.
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openly in those assemblies.95  The “[r]evolutionary state
constitutions, though genuflecting in the direction of sep-
aration of powers and bills of rights, in practice vested
virtually unlimited powers in popularly elected legisla-
tures.”96  were anxious to check the excess of democracy
in the state governments by strengthening the central
authority, but only on condition that the strengthening
be accompanied by attention to several basic principles.
Among these were the complete separation of the three
departments [legislative, executive, and judicial] of gov-
ernment, both in function and in personnel; either a plu-
ral executive or a single executive whose power was
shared and checked by an executive council; a bicameral
legislature, the two houses being chosen by some means
that would ensure that they checked one another; ex-
plicit enumeration of the powers of each branch of gov-
ernment and a declaration that all other powers were
reserved to the states; explicit separation of the ‘power of
the purse’ from the ‘power of the sword,’ and explicit re-
pudiation of standing armies, and an explicit denial of
the power of the national government to charter corpora-
tions or to create monopolies; and a bill of rights.97
Needless to say, a similar set of concerns would no doubt ac-
company establishment of a world order.  And, similarly, the resolu-
tions would need to be made an explicit part of the creation of such an
order if the issues were to be addressed.  The fact that constitutional
democracies are well familiar with how to go about this process at the
national level only gives credence that there would be much to draw
upon at the global level for assistance.  So, my point, at this more spec-
ulative early stage of thinking about world government, is more to
point to what has already been done by many democratic nations and
to suggest that these sources should provide a resource of information
95 Id. at 39 (noting the English Bill of Rights had “confirmed free speech, frequent
meetings of Parliament, and free elections.”).  However, “neither Parliament nor
the colonial assemblies extended the privilege to nonmembers: criticism of legisla-
tive bodies or of royal officials, along with dissenting religious opinions, was rigor-
ously suppressed.” Id. at 46-47.
96 McDonald notes this background to a remark Hamilton made that was pub-
lished in 1774. “ ‘The only distinction between freedom and slavery,’ he wrote, ‘con-
sists in this: In the former state, a man is governed by laws to which he has given
his consent, either in person, or by his representative: In the latter, he is governed
by the will of another.’” Id. at 160.
97 Id. at 202-03.  It is well to note that not all the suggested changes such as “repu-
diation of standing armies” survived even to the end of the Convention, let alone
over time.
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for handling the myriad of procedural problems that would arise in
connection with any world order proposal in an enlightened way.
Although the Bill of Rights would not for some time after its
adoption be viewed to limit the power of the states, specific provisions
like the Fifth Amendment provision against double jeopardy and the
Seventh Amendment’s proviso for juries in civil cases, subject to re-
examination of decisions in accordance with principles of the common
law, was a beginning at bringing down the worries to not reproduce
the former excesses of the British Crown.98  Elsewhere I have identi-
fied important similarities between the Bill of Rights and selected con-
stitutional provisions—like the provision against ex post facto criminal
laws—and various international human rights agreements already in
existence, including those like the Universal Declaration that are more
aspirational, as well as other documents like the “International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights” and the “International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” that define specific legal obli-
gations of nations.99
The importance of these similarities to the present work is that
they provide a basis for guaranteeing—wherever they are enforced—
that persons agreeing to become part of a greater global association
have entered into the arrangement freely and openly, and that any
future agreement will be similarly free and open.  If, for example, free-
dom of speech, press, or the right to vote is denied, then there is little
basis upon which to proclaim the greater association as a people’s
choice unless the people themselves had chosen to limit these
rights.100  But even then there would be a question of whether such a
98 The U.S. Supreme Court didn’t begin until the 1890s to interpret the Four-
teenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, to incorporate several of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights as enforceable against the states. See, e.g., Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
99 See Samar, supra note 87.
100 For example, the “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), provides:
Article 1
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination.  By vir-
tue of that right they freely determine their political sta-
tus and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
. . . .
Article 6
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life.  This
right shall be protected by law.  No one shall be arbitrar-
ily deprived of his life.
. . . .
Article 9
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1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are es-
tablished by law.
. . . .
Article 18
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or
to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either in-
dividually or in community with others and in public or private,
to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice
and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
. . . .
Article 19
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without
interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart infor-
mation and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.
. . . .
Article 21
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.  No restric-
tions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those
imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health
or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
. . . .
Article 22
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association
with others, including the right to form and join trade un-
ions for the protection of his interests.
. . . .
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without
any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unrea-
sonable restrictions:
a. To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives;
b. To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections
which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held
by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of
the electors;
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choice would only serve to support the existing status quo.  Also, if cer-
tain basic rights to be free from arbitrary arrest or imprisonment are
not observed, then basic autonomy is at risk.  Along these same lines
would include protection of families and right of free movement.  Since
social compacts rely on the voluntary choices of individuals operating
freely and with knowledge of relevant circumstances, the presence of
such protections is essential both substantively to protect the people’s
autonomy both now and in the future, and procedurally to insure that
the terms of association are a product of fair and free deliberation.  An
important question, beyond the scope of this essay, is whether and on
what basis certain rights would need protection especially against
short-term majorities who seek to preserve a status quo.101
The substantive side guarantees that the choice is free and in-
formed, and that basic rights are secured provided they not be too nar-
rowly drawn.  The procedural side guarantees equality and fair
opportunity for debate.  This doesn’t mean that one is guaranteed per-
fect knowledge.  It does mean that materially relevant information is
not withheld from the deciders, and most probably that the deciders
have had the opportunity to engage the issue and debate publicly the
relevant choices prior to making their decision.  While no doubt John
Stuart Mill would support such a position from the standpoint of en-
. . . .
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without
any discrimination to the equal protection of the law.  In this re-
spect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to
all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, politi-
cal or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.
101 Interestingly, John Hart Ely, in his book, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of
Judicial Review, argues:
The Constitution has instead proceeded from the quite sensible
assumption that an effective majority will not inordinately
threaten its own rights, and has sought to assure that such a
majority not systematically treat others less well than it treats
itself—by structuring decision processes at all levels to try to en-
sure, first, that everyone’s interests will be actually or virtually
represented (usually both) at the point of substantive decision,
and second, that the processes of individual application will not
be manipulated so as to reintroduce in practice the sort of dis-
crimination that is impermissible in theory.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 100-01
(Harvard University Press 1980)
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suring that the choice that emerges should be accurate and true,102 my
claim here is the more modest: that it should reflect what the choosers
really want.
In this respect, the claim is sufficient if it provides real oppor-
tunity for self-rule.  As John Locke writes:
Man being, as has been said, by nature all free, equal,
and independent, no one can be put out of his estate and
subject to the political power of another without his own
Consent.  The only way whereby any one devests himself
of his Natural Liberty, and puts on the bond of Civil Soci-
ety is by agreeing with other men, to joyn and unite into
a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceful liv-
ing, one amongst another, in a secure Enjoyment of their
Properties, and a greater Security against any that are
not of it.103
In this sense, mutually interested autonomous individuals, and
not the imposition of some authority from on high, set civil society as
the outcrop of a deliberative choice of free and equal citizens.  Locke
describes civil society as a body capable of movement depending where
the greater force of public opinion carries it.104
But, even with that qualification, one must be on guard against
giving into simple passions, which at any time, may not reflect the best
102 “[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is rob-
bing the human race; prosperity as well as the existing generation; those who dis-
sent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it.  If the opinion is right,
they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they
lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impres-
sion of truth, produced by its collision with error.” See JOHN STUART MILL, On
Liberty, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 269 (Max Lerner ed., Bantam
Books 1961).
103 Locke, supra note 86, at 374.
104 Id.  Locke writes:
For when any number of Men have, by the consent of every indi-
vidual, made a Community, they have thereto made that Com-
munity one Body, with a Power to Act as one Body, which is only
by the will and determination of the majority.  For that which
acts any Community, being only the consent of the individuals of
it, and it being necessary to that which is one body to move one
way; it is necessary the Body should move that way whither the
greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or
else it is impossible it should act or continue one Body, one Com-
munity, which the consent of every individual that united into it,
agreed that it should; and so everyone is bound by that consent
to be concluded by the majority.
Id. at 375-76.
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choice, even if it may appear to be the most desirable choice.  What
must govern on matters of great moment is a considered understand-
ing of the views of others along with the evidence that supports each,
while carefully restraining our own passions to judge too quickly and
often unwisely.  And we must take pains to insure balances between
the competing positions, and to follow reason where possible, to insure
not only one voice is heard or becomes too dominant, especially if basic
human rights are in the balance.  If we follow these elements of public
reason, and are careful to implement them in our deliberations, then
like with the founders’ efforts to secure a national Constitution, the
result should secure a global constitution capable of meeting changing
world circumstances of which each nation can be proud.
VII. KINDS OF GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE NOT SUITED TO
BECOME PART OF A WORLD ORDER
Our discussion of two understandings of supremacy has differ-
ent implications for what types of states would be suited for inclusion
in a world order.  The implications follow not only from the two views
of supremacy but also from how they might be implicated within a
state’s decision-making procedure.  For instance, under Thesis One, or
what I will now call the exclusive view, supremacy is manifested paro-
chially.  One form of this would be the requirement that any transfer
of state responsibilities to an international or global body must be pro-
vided for under the existing national constitution including any
amendments adopted for that purpose.  Another form of restriction is
where the officers of the state are tied to a particular set of moral or
religious doctrines from which they cannot deviate.  Both situations
are problematic for an international order but for different reasons.
In the first situation, the global order emerges from the consti-
tutional operations of the various nations making it up.  This gives rise
to the possibility that an action of the global body could be held uncon-
stitutional by a national court if it were deemed to fall beyond the
scope of powers assigned by the domestic constitution to that body.  In
other words, the global order would be hostage to individual state
court constitutional interpretations, essentially marking the global or-
der as a confederacy of independent sovereigns much the way the
American states interrelated—or didn’t—prior to the adoption of the
Constitution.105
105 One interpretation of states’ rights under the Constitution was that an agree-
ment existed among the states and, as such, states could secede from the agree-
ment.  In Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1869), the United States Supreme Court
ruled that while the union was “perpetual” and secession ordinances “absolutely
null,” membership in the union could be revoked “through revolution, or through
consent of the States.”
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The second situation raises a different problem.  While not nec-
essarily interfering with the delegation of powers, it constrains how
those powers might be exercised.  For instance, if a state had a particu-
larly conservative religious view of marriage and family life, it might
refuse to follow any directive from an international tribunal affording
global recognition to same-sex marriages.  This contrasts with the first
situation, where a state, even if it did not have so narrow a moral or
religious dogma, might refuse to recognize an international tribunal’s
decision if there was a domestic prohibition against recognizing inter-
national obligations before they were formally adopted at the national
level.
In either situation, then, the parochial effect of the local
supremacy interpretation could substantially limit development of a
global order in which persons would have certain rights regardless of
where they lived or traveled.  In effect, we see this problem manifested
today with nations putting reservations into international agreements
regarding what rights or interpretations of international law they will
follow.  For example, some Islamic states reserve from obligations
under a treaty not to discriminate against women because it is part of
their society’s culture or religion to do so.  Likewise, the United States
reserves from abolishing the death penalty as a form of criminal pun-
ishment because its Constitution does not prohibit it, or is thought to
prohibit assigning to outsiders how it will be interpreted even in re-
gards to international law.106
We also find the parochial effect of local supremacy clauses dis-
played in national court determinations like those of the U.S. Supreme
Court, which hold that directives from international courts do not bind
federal or state court decisions.107  The broad effect of such a potential
hodgepodge of limitations and constraints on the authority of the in-
106 For example, the United States has reserved the right in signing the Interna-
tional Convention on Civil and Political Rights, “to impose capital punishment on
any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under existing or future
laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment . . .”  138 CONG. REC. S4781-
01 (daily ed. April 3, 1992).
107 In Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), a Mexican national under death
sentence for capital murder sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court after a
decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), in Case Concerning Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I. C. J. 12 (Judgment of Mar. 31),
held “that, based on violations of the Vienna Convention, fifty-one named Mexican
nationals were entitled to review and reconsideration of their state-court convic-
tions and sentences in the United States. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
dismissed Medellin’s application for failure to raise the Vienna claim in a timely
manner and the case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  Finding that the
treaty in question was not intended by Congress to be self-executing, a five mem-
ber majority of the Supreme Court upheld the Texas court’s decision not to require
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ternational order would be somewhat analogous to the difficulties the
founders of the American Constitution  encountered when they finally
concluded that the Articles of Confederation could no longer be
sustained.
Let us now consider how Thesis Two, which I call the inclusive
view of supremacy, might alter this pattern.  Under a strong interpre-
tation of this view, a national constitution would not play the decisive
role in determining whether an international action is legitimate or
not, at least not once the country had become part of the greater world
order. .  A national constitution may provide a mechanism, such as
treaty power for becoming part of a world government, but additional
mechanisms may also be provided as set by the rules of the global
body, notwithstanding that those rules may formally violate a national
constitution supremacy clause, provided they can garner domestic le-
gitimacy.  Use of other mechanisms that might appeal more directly to
the World’s people would avoid nations from being justified in opting
out of the government because another country had violated the terms
of the treaty.  If  public reason is operating effectively, rules which vio-
late human rights, such as those discussed in the prior section, should
not be set up.  This is analogous to the manner in which ratification of
the U.S. Constitution was allowed to bypass state constitutional
supremacy clauses, once it was agreed that a Bill of Rights which sets
forth rights of both citizens and the states, would be introduced by the
first Congress of the new United States.  The founders proposed a pro-
cedure in Article VI of the soon-to-be-ratified U.S. Constitution that
had been unanimously adopted by resolution of the Confederation
Congress.  This procedure proposed using conventions in each state to
determine whether that state would ratify the Constitution, and to
have the Constitution come into effect in the ratifying states after only
nine had adopted it notwithstanding that the Articles of Confederation
had endorsed unanimity.  Once the new Constitution was adopted, it
dominated  what further authority remained with the states according
to its own terms, except for what had been reserved in the Bill of
Rights.
A more narrow interpretation of the Second Thesis would allow
a national constitution to specify the condition for membership, pro-
vided that once membership was obtained, the nation could no longer
opt-out without the agreement of the larger association.  To do any less
would constrain the authority of the greater association, in effect hold-
ing it hostage when considering any controversial action, by threat of
national successions.  In American history, this threat to federal au-
further review and reconsideration of Medellin’s state court conviction notwith-
standing the earlier ICJ decision.
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thority did arise over the slavery issue and was ultimately resolved
only by civil war.
An important further implication for the global community
that arises from these considerations concerns the types of states that
could be admitted as global members.  Nations who profess an ideolog-
ical view in a particular religious or moral dogma, except as it might
contribute to social cooperation or protection of individual autonomy
as a basic human right could not be admitted as full members.  These
nations could potentially  play the role of an observer, the way the Vat-
ican City state presently does in the United Nations.  They  have not
been able to become full members of a world government because their
laws may not allow the extension of global authority over matters they
disagree with due to religious or cultural reasons.108  And while a simi-
lar provision to the American first amendment protection of free exer-
cise and non-establishment of religion should be recognized
internationally as an obligation of world government, it is difficult to
imagine states with strong religious traditions acceding to such an ar-
rangement.  Consequently, I find it inconceivable that states—which,
for any of several reasons, follow my first view of supremacy—would
be able to join a global world order.
CONCLUSION
In this essay, I have considered two different normative views
of supremacy.  Thesis One, presenting the more usual understanding,
makes supremacy an all or nothing engagement.  Under this view, pa-
rochialism reigns as the possibility of developing world government
and international law wanes.109  Regimes whose source of authority
allow for no alteration can only limitedly become part of an interna-
tional order, as they will by their own dogma always remain on the
sidelines.  Thesis Two, the other more directional understanding of
supremacy, is the not-so-typical, but in another sense is more demo-
cratic because it treats supremacy as operating within a limited thea-
ter of judgments.  Under this view, all judgments should not fall
within the same theatre of operation, but only certain judgments.  And
it allows for the possibility that judgments formerly within one theater
of national government may be moved to a different forum of world
government upon incorporation into the greater association.  In that
sense, Thesis Two provides much greater latitude for the possible de-
108 To borrow from a U.S. example, states which were concerned that they might
be forced to recognize same-sex marriages made in sister states under the Consti-
tution’s requirement that each state give full faith and credit to the public acts of
every other states, sought congressional support to limit the application of this
provision, as allowed for under the Constitution.
109 See, e.g., Paulsen, supra note 1.
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velopment of a serious world order, to say nothing about international
law.  What the second view does not do is undermine the making of
these judgments the way Thesis One might allow in support of a relig-
ious or moral dogma, or state-centered parochialism.  It does recognize
that final judgment of an issue must be left to general acceptance.
While Thesis Two allows for wider scorings of persons, it is consistent
with those basic human rights that promote and maintain free and
open decision-making by autonomous individuals, even at the same
time that it acknowledges the possibility of constraints from sources
outside the existing governmental apparatus.
Where the world goes from here is an open question.  Where
the United States goes from here is equally open.  While there are good
reasons to believe that our own interests might be better secured by
becoming part of a larger world order, it is by no means clear that this
is what Americans want or will accept in the near future.  What is
hoped is that this essay should widen the range of discussion:  That
while much of the rest of the world is coming to recognize the legality
of international law and the decisions of international tribunals as
part of their own national law; the United States now needs to seri-
ously consider just how far to join such an effort—the way the nations
of Europe, for example, joined together to create the European Union
and the European Court of Human Rights.  But this will only be possi-
ble if Americans can first legitimate where international law and deci-
sions of international tribunals interface with its current
constitutional structure and traditions.
Most likely this would begin with the treaty process or possibly
by some other acceptable method of affiliation.  Still, whatever method
is adopted Americans will need to come to terms with the fact that
such an international tribunal may come to very different conclusions
than even the Supreme Court of the United States.  How Americans
choose to meet this challenge may be just as important as the chal-
lenge they met two centuries ago.
If this venture into the meaning of supremacy in our Constitu-
tion has shown anything it is that laws from outside the constitutional
structure that reference wider associations can be found to be legiti-
mate, provided they arise by a procedure Americans can appreciate as
democratic, support goals most Americans want, and do not violate
those basic civil rights Americans have come to take for granted.  How-
ever contentious the current debate concerning constitutional
supremacy for the current generation of Americans may be, future
generation will no doubt find themselves having to confront this issue
in much broader relief.  What we do today in providing them the tools
to handle this problem will aide America in deciding whether to shed
its parochialism to become part of a global world order.
